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Cet article explore l'intercommunication entre la politique et le cinéma des Balkans après 2008. Il vise 
à offrir un cadrage conceptuel du cinéma balkanique contemporain en mettant en lumière le rôle de la 
politique dans sa formation comme objet d’étude. Par « politique », je me réfère aux relations de 
pouvoir dans l’espace des pays, entre pays, communautés et citoyens et à la manière dont celles-ci se 
manifestent dans la réalisation des films et des textes filmiques. En examinant les relations entre la 
politique et le cinéma balkanique, je soulève des questions principales et j’utilise des exemples 
indicatifs pour soutenir mes thèses. La principale question examinée ici est de savoir comment le 
cinéma balkanique a été développé et influencé par les facteurs politiques et les relations de pouvoir 
entre la crise financière mondiale de 2008 et la crise pandémique (en cours au moment de la 
rédaction) de 2020. 
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This paper explores the interface between politics and post-2008 Balkan cinema. It 
aims to offer a conceptual framing of contemporary Balkan cinema by highlighting the role 
of politics in its formation as an object of study. By politics I refer to relations of power 
within and across countries, communities and citizens, and to the ways in which these 
manifest themselves in the process of the films’ making and on the filmic texts. In looking at 
the relationship between Balkan cinema and politics, I raise some overarching questions and 
use indicative examples in order to illustrate my answers. The key overall question is how has 
cinema in the Balkans been informed and affected by political factors and power relations in 
the period between the global financial crisis of 2008 and the (ongoing at the time of writing) 
pandemic crisis of 2020. 
Before exploring this question, it is important to clarify why use the term “Balkans” 
to refer to the geographical area that is otherwise often called South Eastern Europe. As 
Maria Todorova ([1997] /2009) has compellingly demonstrated, the term “Balkans” is laden 
with negative connotations. Originally a Turkish word meaning mountain or stony place, it 
gradually began to allude to notions of darkness, fragmentation and discord. It was Western 
travellers in the 18th century who first used the term to refer to this region when they visited 
the Westernmost provinces of the Ottoman Empire in search of idealised visions of classical 
past, but found instead a very different and, in their view, debased reality. The subsequent 
break-down of the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan wars of the early 20th century, and the violent 
post-communist breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s entrenched such negative stereotypes 
(Wolff 1994, Todorova [1997] 2009). 
The adoption of the term “Balkan” here aims to challenge these negative perceptions 
by highlighting a multifaceted, dynamic and changing reality in the region, especially with 
regard to cinematic activity. This reality is defined mainly – but not exclusively – by the 
region’s increased European orientation in this period. Grouping together the cinemas of the 
different countries of the region under the conceptual umbrella “Balkan” is therefore a 
political and polemical choice that can support the argument that, considered together, these 









As the Balkans is not an officially defined geographical area, there are varying 
understandings about where it is. The narrowest definitions restrict it to the area around the 
Balkan Mountains – Haemus in (Ancient) Greek – which cut across Bulgaria and Eastern 
Serbia. Often, and especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, it is used interchangeably with 
“Western Balkans”, the area covered by the former Yugoslavia. Here I adopt a broad and 
inclusive approach of the Balkans based on historical and geographical criteria.0F1 Thus, aside 
from Bulgaria and the seven countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo) the 
notion of the Balkans I refer to includes Turkey in the East, Greece and Cyprus in the south, 
Albania in the West, and Romania in the North. 
This is a markedly varied group of thirteen countries that can make it difficult to 
conceptualise them as a unified whole. There are evident differences with regard to size, 
economy, political identity, the extent to which they have been impacted by the global 
financial crisis of 2008, and, inevitably, the profiles of their cinemas. Indicatively and with 
respect to differences in size (of population, landmass and films produced) Turkey is by far 
the largest country with a population of 84 million people, a landmass of almost 800,000 
square kilometres and an average production of 90 films a year (often with significant box 
office returns); Montenegro has the smallest population with 600,000 inhabitants spread over 
13,000 square kilometres, and its average production is two-to-three films a year; Kosovo has 
a slightly lower cinematic output, and has the smallest area of a Balkan country (11,000 sq 
km), while being quite densely populated (two million inhabitants).1F2   Differences in economy 
across Balkan countries are equally staggering, with some markedly poorer than others. For 
example, in 2018 the Republic of Cyprus ranked 38th with almost 30 thousand USD annual 
per capita GDP, while Kosovo was 118th, with a GDP of just over four thousand USD. 3 
Politically, the differences among countries still largely depend (with the exception of 
Greece, Turkey and Cyprus) on the legacy of (post) communism – although this is gradually 
lessening. Crucially, they also depend on the impact of nationalist ideas on the polity, 
especially as these underpin the lack of resolution of certain cross-border disputes (most 
significantly between Serbia and Kosovo).4 There are also differences in the degree of 
integration with Europe, as six countries are full members of the European Union (Greece 
since 1981; Slovenia and Cyprus since 2004; Bulgaria and Romania since 2007; and Croatia 
since 2013), while others (Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia) have been aligning 
themselves to European mechanisms in the hope of future recognition – a process somehow 
dampened by developments in 2019. 5 For Turkey, which is larger and most populous than 
the sum of the rest of the Balkan countries, the relationship with Europe has been the most 
ambivalent, as its geopolitical significance assigns it with economic and political advantages 
that allow it to fluctuate its position towards Europe at will. 
Considering the above, it is not surprising that the financial crisis of 2008 impacted 
mostly on the countries that were closely integrated to the European and global economy, that 
is, Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia – the three countries that were both members of the 
European Union and the Eurozone. For the rest, the impact was more indirect and dissipated. 
 
1 For a detailed rationale of the criteria for selecting these countries, see Papadimitriou and Grgić (2020). 
2 Data from http://worldpopulationreview.com; for the annual cinematic output, see Papadimitriou and Grgić 
(2020). 
3 Data from http://statisticstimes.com/economy/world-gdp-capita-ranking.php 
4 For a discussion of recent developments in the Serbia/Kosovo dispute, see 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/kosovo-president-and-pm-at-odds-over-serbia-border- 
changes/ 













For Montenegro and Kosovo, the post-2008 period marks their first steps as independent 
countries: the former broke out from Serbia in 2006 while the latter declared its independence 
in 2008 (although it remains recognised by only about half of the United Nations’ 
membership). As such they absorbed the impact of the European crisis while developing new 
political alignments and trying to assert their presence in the regional and European fields. 
The post-2008 period in the Balkans has been characterised not only by the negative effects 
of the financial crisis on some countries, but also by a relative stability in the region as most 
ethnic and cross-border disputes have been resolved. 6 
Despite all these and other differences (such as the variety of languages, religions and 
even the degree of acceptance of “Balkan” as self-definition), the argument put forward by 
Dina Iordanova about an underlying level of cultural similarities across the region remains 
valid (Iordanova 2006). What motivates this focus on contemporary Balkan cinema is the 
will to highlight the degree, kind and often quality of cinematic activity that has taken place 
in the region, despite and beyond such political, social and economic variation. Furthermore, 
it stems from the observation that in the post-2008 period cross-border collaboration has 
become, if not the norm, certainly a widely accepted and desired practice in film production.7 
Closer examination of the production and financing contexts of co-produced films in the 
Balkans shows that cross-country collaboration has largely been the effect of European 
policies and institutions regarding cinema, to which all Balkan countries (with the exception 
of Kosovo) adhere and are part of: the European Convention on Cinematographic Co- 
production that provides the overall legal framework for co-productions and Eurimages, the 
“cultural support fund of the Council of Europe” (Council of Europe A and B. Blázquez 
2018). 8 This does not mean that all co-productions have been co-financed by Eurimages, but 
that there is increased aspiration in being able to access such funds, which has intensified co- 
production arrangements with both extra-and intra-regional European partners (that is with 
partners from both Western and Central Europe, and other Balkan countries). Overall, in 
other words, there been a marked Europeanisation of the production contexts and, arguably, 
of the thematic and stylistic approach of a number of films produced by Balkan countries in 
this period.9 
In what follows, I raise two related questions that point to the significance of 
reconceptualising post-2008 era Balkan cinema in the light of the broader political re- 
alignments in the region: Does contemporary cinema from the Balkans function as a 
politically unifying regional force, seeking to overcome ethno-nationalist divisions in the 
region? And does the practice of co-productions (which is underpinned by European policies) 
help define a new Balkan cinema, politically aligned with (progressive) European values? 
The answer to these questions requires some further qualifications. As already pointed out, 
since 2008, there has been an increased number of cinematic collaborations across Balkan 
countries, including across a number involving countries with a politically sensitive history. 
Furthermore, a number of these films have thematised the desire and need to overcome past 
divisions. However, the field of “contemporary Balkan cinema” does not just consist of co- 
 
6 A positive example of recent progress is the Prespa agreement of June 2018 which resolved the name dispute 
between Greece and the now-renamed North Macedonia: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/12/nato- 
flag-raised-ahead-of-north-macedonias-prospective-accession. The Kosovo-Serbia dispute mentioned above 
remains the key area of contestation in the Balkans. 
7 For a more in-depth overview see the collection of essays Contemporary Balkan Cinema: Transnational 
Exchanges and Global Circuits that presents critical country profiles of all thirteen Balkan countries’ post-
2008 cinematic activity, while highlighting transnational activity across and beyond them (Papadimitriou and 
Grgić 2020). 
8 The European Union’s Creative Europe MEDIA programme has also provided European institutional support 
with regard to development and post-production (https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/creative-europe/actions/media_en). 






productions. Indeed, the majority of films are still made nationally, with a combination of 
state support and commercial capital. And many Balkan countries, especially the newer ones 
(which happen to be those that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia), use cinema for 
nation-building, both in the sense of creating a national corpus and tradition (and therefore 
legitimising their presence) and making films which more or less explicitly promote 
nationalist ideas. So, while transnational co-productions have certainly increased (and these 
happen to be the films that mostly circulate outside the borders of a particular country), they 
are still the exception rather than the norm.10 
As a result, while the political impact of Balkan cinema in terms of reinforcing 
aspirations of Balkan and European unity should not be overstated, it is certainly important to 
highlight the positive effect that cross-border collaborations have had on both production 
contexts and texts, and the way in which they could hail a new, more outward and globally 
visible, era for Balkan cinema. Collaborations refer to the pooling of resources (financial, but 
also talent) across countries to achieve not only higher production values, but also the 
potential of reaching larger cross-border audiences. Such collaborations vary in kind: They 
can be co-productions - both official, i.e. bound by the terms of treaties, such as the European 
Convention of Cinematographic Co-production; and unofficial, i.e. those that take place 
outside such frameworks. But they can also be cross-border collaborations at the stages of 
development, or distribution and exhibition. In (re)conceptualising Balkan cinema, co- 
productions (and co-development) are more important because they lead to films that can 
have shared cultural characteristics that may project transnational values and imagery. 
Politically, in other words, such films are more likely to convey a progressive, pacifist and 
conciliatory agenda (although nothing precludes films not made across-borders to also adopt 
such an agenda). 
Looking at the geography of cinematic collaborations across Balkan countries, it is 
evident that most happen among countries with pre-existing cultural and political affinities. 
This is a characteristic that Mette Hjort has labelled “affinitive transnationalism” (Hjort 2009: 
17). Transnational films sometimes tell stories in which characters cross borders and 
locations change, making evident the transnational nature of their funding and mode of 
production, while other times they seem just like any other national film (with the 
transnational nature in such cases being restricted to “behind the scenes” collaborations than 
on-screen content). The label “Balkan cinema” therefore refers to the sum total of national 
films made in Balkan countries, in other words, both those that do, and those that do not, 
involve cross-border collaborations. Furthermore, it is worth stressing that a Balkan film does 
not have to be about the Balkans. Its references may only be local or national, and its 
concerns may not involve an explicit reference to, or search for, Balkan identity. 
While some films have engaged with the concept of the Balkans – most famously, 
Theo Angelopoulos’ 1995 Ulysses’ Gaze – for most films from the region their Balkan (and 
even their national) identity is not a topic of exploration, but a backdrop and a de facto 
identity. Indeed, the Balkans as a concept does not feature particularly prominently in the 
cinemas of the region, and this may be explained by the refusal to become associated with 
what is perceived as a negative identity. Rather, we need to actively look out for traces of a 
Balkan identity by adopting a cross-cultural gaze as audiences and critics. We can, in other 
words, argue that there remains a certain cultural sensibility characteristic of the region, and 
that this loosely connects these films thematically and aesthetically. Dina Iordanova first 
identified such a quality a couple of decades ago when she started talking about Balkan 
cinema. I argue that despite the post-2008 geopolitical, social and demographic changes such 
 
 
10 For the number of films produced per Balkan country, including the number of co-productions, see 





a sensibility is still present, but it is now shaped by a stronger (although not always 
unambiguous) desire for Europe. This process has been the result of political transformations 
in Europe (mainly the drive towards the European Union’s expansion) that have made the 
possibility of “belonging” more concrete.0F11 Cinema from the Balkans explores such tensions, 
even if they are not consciously and specifically alluding to this political landscape or framed 
as ‘Balkan’. For this reason, despite the films’ variety and lack of uniformity, Balkan cinema 
can certainly constitute a meaningful and valid object of study. 
Let me then conclude this polemic by giving some examples of cinematic 
collaborations that can give a taste for this new Balkan cinema that projects progressive, 
European values.   While, as I already pointed out, Europe-oriented cinema is not the only 
kind made in the Balkans, nor the most numerous, it is the cinema that circulates most 
beyond a particular country’s and the region’s borders, and it is the Balkan cinema I want to 
draw attention to here, as I believe that it represents the region’s chance to address, redress 
and re-appropriate its negative stereotyping. 
I start with examples from the countries of the former Yugoslavia largely because 
they represent the most consistent group of collaborating countries and because are they often 
understood as emblematic of the Balkans.12 It may seem odd that countries which violently 
fought each other for national independence as recently as the 1990s would have regular 
cinematic collaborations. However, as constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, they all had their own studios and production facilities, therefore recent 
collaborations have built on pre-existing relationships and practices. Furthermore, the 
languages across these republics are (to varying degree) mutually comprehensible – which 
means both that collaboration among creatives and technicians is easier, while the films can 
cross borders more easily. It should also be noted that co-productions give access to larger 
overall budgets, and therefore they are particularly useful for smaller countries with limited 
resources. The examples provided below are indicative and space limitations do not allow me 
to delve into the films’ thematic and stylistic choices in any detail, but only to give a brief 
indication of how they can help (re)conceptualise Balkan cinema by placing emphasis on 
cross-border collaboration and exchange. 
Croatian director, Dalibor Matanic’s The High Sun (2015) is a Eurimages-supported 
co-production between Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia. This formally innovative film, which won 
the Jury Prize of the “Un Certain Regard” section at the Cannes Film Festival, consists of 
three parts each set on a different decade (starting in the 1990s), and telling, in each 
part/decade, the story of forbidden love between a Serb and a Croat. Each decade focuses on 
a different couple, but the actors who play the central characters are the same. The effect is to 
undermine (ethnic) difference and underline the healing power of love. The story is not new, 
but the way it is told is, and this makes it very effective despite otherwise lacking specific 
political and social contextualisation. 
Two other co-productions from the former Yugoslavia, both directed by women, 
adopt a more conventionally realist approach in pointing to some of the residual traces of the 
wars. In A Good Wife (Serbia/Bosnia-Herzegovina/Croatia, 2016) Mirjana Karanović, who 
also directed the film, plays a Serbian woman who finds out that her husband had been a war 
criminal. Unable to confront him directly, she faces difficult decisions about how to respond. 
The film is a slow-burning family drama that focuses on the main character’s inner conflict 
and ethical dilemmas, and in the process exposes the corrupting effect of lies. Hannah Slak’s 
The Miner (Slovenia/Croatia/Germany, 2017) is based on the true story of a Slovenian miner 
 
11 As suggested earlier, by the time of writing the extent to which such a political direction will remain 
sustainable and desired is very unclear, as the challenges of Brexit and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, 
among others, are likely to create new political dynamics in Europe – and beyond. 
12 See for example, Mazaj 2007. 
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of Bosnian origin, who discovered a pit with 4000 executed bodies from World War II. While 
the film does not explicitly focus on the wars in former Yugoslavia, the parallelisms implied 
are evident, and (not unlike A Good Wife) it raises questions about social justice and the 
redeeming effect of the truth. 
Bojan Vuletić's Requiem for Mrs J (Serbia/Bulgaria/North Macedonia/ Russia/ 
France/ Germany, 2017) Eurimages-supported co-production, also stars Serbian Mirjana 
Karanović. Adopting a semi-comic tone and a Romanian New Wave-influenced deadpan 
realism, the film tells the story of a Serbian war widow who plans to commit suicide as she 
cannot handle the bleakness of contemporary life. A satire of inefficient bureaucracy and the 
absurdities experienced in what is presented as a stagnant society, the film conveys a 
sensibility shared across different parts of the region, while the ghosts of the traumatic past 
are alluded to, but remain in the background. 
As suggested by these examples, many co-productions between countries of the 
former Yugoslavia deal with war-related traumas. This is arguably the result of the 
therapeutic potential of cinema and art, more generally, that can offer a very powerful tools to 
work  through  collective  trauma.2F13  It  should  be  pointed  out  too  that  European  support  has 
prioritised films and projects that explore this difficult past, precisely because of their healing 
power. Evidence of this approach is the establishment (with European funds) of the Sarajevo 
Film Festival in 1995 during the Bosnian war. As stated on the festival’s website, this was 
part of the effort to help “reconstruct civil society” after the destruction of the city’s 
multicultural fabric (Sarajevo Film Festival A). The festival continues to have strands that 
explicitly address issues related to its traumatic past, showing how this past is embedded in 
the identity of both the festival and the city (Sarajevo Film Festival B). 
While co-productions across most former Yugoslav countries (Serbia, Croatia, 
Bosnia, Slovenia, North Macedonia and Montenegro) is common, the still unresolved 
relationship between Kosovo and Serbia has precluded any cinematic collaboration between 
the two so far. This however has not stopped Kosovo becoming involved in a number of co- 
productions with other former Yugoslav countries. At the time of writing, its most renowned 
director Isa Qosja is reported to be working on The Stork a co-production between 
Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania and North Macedonia, which has also received support from 
Eurimages. The story focuses on migration of ethnic Albanians to Montenegro, “a 
development that started in the 60s of the last century and is continuing today” (Film New 
Europe 2019). It is therefore an excellent example of a transnational co-production that 
thematises the migration of an ethnic group (crossing borders in the story), while also being a 
story about one ethnic group – Albanians – that is divided across country borders (thus 
drawing on a strong sense of national belonging). Another co-production among countries 
with strong ethnic Albanian presence is Ismet Sijarina’s Cold November 
(Kosovo/Albania/North Macedonia) that focuses on the early 1990s and tells a politically 
charged story based on true events: it highlights the consequences of the cancellation of 
Kosovar autonomy within the then crumbling Yugoslavia by the Serbs. Both these films are 
clear instances of “affinitive transnationalism” as the co-productions take place across 
ethnically aligned countries (since, apart from Kosovo and Albania, Montenegro and North 
Macedonia also have a significant presence of ethnic Albanians). This is transnational Balkan 
cinema but with a strong ethnic and national character. 
Aside from enabling small countries and ethnic groups with limited cinematic 
presence to become visible, the post-2008 period has seen an increased number of co- 
productions between countries with a history of political tensions. For the vast majority of 
these co-productions, the cross-country collaboration is not visible on screen (in the story, the 
 
13 For a detailed examination of trauma in post-Yugoslav cinema, see Jelača 2016. 
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characters or the location), but rather it consists of behind-the-scenes contributions. For 
example, Greece often provides post-production facilities for neighbouring Balkan countries. 
Bulgarian co-directors Kristina Grozeva and Petar Valchanov have co-produced all their 
films so far with Greece (The Lesson, 2014; Glory, 2016; The Father, 2019), while Gjorce 
Stavreski’s Secret Ingredient (2017), a North Macedonian comedy that won the audience 
award at the Thessaloniki Film Festival and tells the story of a son who gives marijuana to his 
sick father, was also completed in Greek post-production studios. 
Majority Greek co-productions have also benefitted from collaborations with Balkan 
countries. Elina Psykou’s Greek Eurimages-supported film Son of Sofia (2017), was a co- 
production with Bulgaria and France, whereby the Bulgarian contribution consisted mainly in 
the camera and visual effects crews. Yorgos Zois’ experimental Interruption (2015) 
benefitted from Croatian funds, while Nikos Labot’s Her Job (2018), an empowering story 
focusing on an oppressed Greek housewife, received financial support from Serbia. None of 
these films show visible evidence of being co-productions. Greece has also been involved as 
a minority co-production partner with neigbouring Balkan countries quite extensively. Here 
are some Albanian/Greek co-productions (all in Albanian language, and all supported by 
Eurimages): Amnesty (Bujar Alimani, Albania/Greece/France, 2010), Agon (Robert Budina, 
Albania/Greece/France/Romania, 2011), Daybreak (Gentian Koci, Albania/Greece, 2017); 
and some Turkish/Greek co-productions: Motherland (Senem Tuzen 2015); Beyond the Hill 
(Emin Alper 2012); A Tale of Three Sisters (Emin Alper 2019). I do not have the space to 
closely examine the content of these films, but it is fair to claim that they are bearers of 
progressive values with regard to freedom, equality, justice, peace – with issues such as 
giving voice and supporting the rights of women in largely patriarchal contexts being 
particularly prominent. 
In order to illustrate this last point, I will conclude with reference to a film that 
premiered at the Berlin Film Festival in 2019, the North Macedonian/Belgian/Slovenian/ 
Croatian and French co-production God Exists, Her Name is Petrunia (2019). The film is 
directed by Teona Strugar Mitevska, a female director from North Macedonia who is based in 
Brussels. It tells the story of a woman who jumps into the river during the Orthodox church’s 
ceremony of the sanctification of the water and collects the cross. The narrative conflict 
arises from the fact that the church (and the local lads/thugs) do not accept that a woman has 
the right to win the cross. 
Situated in the provincial town of Stip in North Macedonia, this is a story of female 
empowerment set in the context of a traditionally patriarchal, religious and provincial society. 
The conflicts it illustrates could take place elsewhere, but they also have a distinctly Balkan 
flavour as a lot of these societies continue to be deeply patriarchal, while religion is often 
the bearer of traditional and often reactionary values. Adopting a feminist perspective, the 
film positions us on the side of Petrunia, the central character, an overweight, educated but 
unemployed 32-year old woman, who still lives with her parents, and who is effectively 
‘stuck in a rut’ in this provincial town with no prospects. During an interview for a job as a 
secretary at a local factory, the boss half-reluctantly hits on her to then tell her that she is too 
old and ugly to deserve his attention and get the position she applied for. It is on her way back 
home after this encounter that Petrunia sees the ritual take place and, on a spontaneous whim, 
jumps into the river to get the cross. 
The film’s feminism is indicative of the progressive and European values that it 
promotes. The religious ritual and the entrenched behaviour of the males are presented as in 
need of reforming – but also, arguably, as objects for the Western exotic gaze who can 
observe in awe the backwardness of the place. Something contradictory thus takes place here: 
on one level the film reproduces certain negative stereotypes about the Balkans regarding its 
“backwardness”; on the other it tells the story of a protagonist who reacts against these 
12 
 
negative qualities. By doing so in a cinematic language that is recognised as artistically 
worthy, it helps positions the main country of its origin (where the story is set) in the map of 
European and World cinema, and thus retrieving it from its perceived ‘backwardness’ – 
cinematically, at least. 
Politics is everywhere in cinema – and in Balkan cinema. It does not have to be 
explicit, but it informs the worldviews of what is presented, and the author/directors’ 
sympathies. And as cinema is not created in a vacuum but depends on significant resources 
(both financial and human), the policies that enable it to be produced matter. In order for 
Balkan cinema to (continue to) flourish, audiences, institutions, creatives and academic need 
to engage with it, critique, celebrate it. To turn it into a valid object of study and enjoyment – 
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